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Abstract: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was an American jurist who published a 
series of articles between 1909 and 1917 that were very important for 20th 
century analytical philosophy of right. In these articles, Hohfeld analyzed how 
jurists and judges alike use the word ‘right’ to speak of the rights of groups 
and individuals. Since he presented his articles, it has been commonplace 
among ‘hohfeldian specialists’ to distinguish rights into four groups: privi-
leges, or claims, powers and immunities. This paper has four sections. In sec-
tion I, I present Hohfeld’s notion of privilege and point to a difficulty that has 
long been known by specialists, namely, that there are actually two significantly 
different legal relations that this notion is supposed to cover. In section II, I 
analyze and criticize the way (Wenar 2005) proposes we should define these 
two legal relations. In section III, I do the same with suggestion proposed by 
(Moritz 1960, 1073). In section IV, I present my own suggestion about how 
we should understand them. 
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I. 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was an American jurist who pub-
lished a series of articles between 1909 and 1917 that were 
very important for 20th century analytical philosophy of right 
and established Hohfeld as a major precursor to the deontic 
 
1 Recebido: 25-08-2017/ Aceito: 30-10-2017/ Publicado: 15-08-2019. 
2 Daniel Simão Nascimento é Pós-doutorando em filosofia na Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Pelotas, RS, 
Brasil. 
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logic that was later formulated by Von Wright3. His two ma-
jor contributions were the articles “Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (Hohfeld, 
1913) and “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning” (Hohfeld, 1917). In these articles, he an-
alyzed how jurists and judges alike use the word ‘right’ to 
speak of the rights of groups and individuals such as the right 
of free speech, the right to vote, the right to abort and etc.  
According to Hohfeld, although the word ‘right’ is used in 
juridical contexts to name several different juridical rela-
tions, there are some basic meanings of the word, each of 
those basic meanings express a clear and simple juridical fact 
and all rights are in fact complex juridical facts made up of 
the agglutination of these simple juridical facts. In his arti-
cles, Hohfeld distinguished between four forms of ascription 
of rights: ascriptions of ‘privilege’, ‘right’, ‘power’ and ‘im-
munity’. Today, many hohfeldian specialists prefer to speak 
of ‘liberty’ instead of ‘privilege’ and of ‘claim’ instead of 
‘right’. Indeed, Hohfeld himself suggested the word ‘claim’ 
as a possible synonym of ‘right’ (Hohfeld 1913, 32), and he 
also held both that what we usually call legal liberties are legal 
privileges (Hohfeld 1913, 36), and that the closest synonym 
of legal privilege seems to be legal liberty (Hohfeld 1913, 41). 
In what follows, I have chosen to use ‘claim’ instead of right, 
‘privilege’ instead of liberty and to quote authors in their 
own terms in order to respect their own choices. 
The first mention of privileges in (Hohfeld 1913) comes 
when the author is discussing what he calls “operative facts”. 
According to Hohfeld’s nomenclature, operative facts are 
facts which, under the general legal rules, suffice to change 
legal relations so as to create a new relation, extinguish an 
 
3 On this point see Saunders 1990: 465.  
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old one, or perform both of these functions simultaneously 
(Hohfeld 1913, 25). The mention of privilege appears with 
the following examples of operative facts, 
 
 [...] if X commits an assault on Y by putting the latter in fear of bodily 
harm, this particular group of facts immediately create in Y the privi-
lege of self-defense – that is, the privilege of using sufficient force to 
repel X's attack; or, correlatively, the otherwise existing duty of Y to 
refrain from the application of force to the person of X is, by virtue of 
the special operative facts, immediately terminated or extinguished. 
(Hohfeld 1913, 26). 
 
We find a second and most important passage about priv-
ileges a few pages ahead, when Hohfeld outlines his general 
conception of privilege. According to what is said there, 
 
 [...] if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, 
the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to 
stay off the place. If, as seems desirable, we should seek a synonym for 
the term “right” in this limited and proper meaning, perhaps the word 
“claim” would prove the best.  [...] a privilege is the opposite of a duty, 
and the correlative of a “no-right”. In the example last put, whereas X 
has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he 
himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent 
words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is 
the negation of a duty to stay off. (Hohfeld 1913, 32). 
 
In this passage Hohfeld uses the word ‘right’ to refer both 
to claims and privileges. Although his notion of claim is not 
the focus of this paper, it will be useful to have a working 
definition of it because it will inevitably appear in our argu-
ment. For our present purposes, we can say that according to 
Hohfeld an individual A has a legal claim against another 
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when this other has a legal duty to to do something4. As for 
the notion of privilege, Hohfeld clearly identifies the legal 
privilege of entering with the negation of a legal duty to stay 
off. As many have noted, according to hohfeld a legal privi-
lege is the ‘jural opposite’ of a legal duty, i.e. of a legal obli-
gation, which means that the sentences ‘a legal privilege to 
phi’ and ‘the absence of a legal duty not to phi’ express one 
and the same legal fact5.  
Although many specialists still adopt Hohfeld’s formula-
tions of the four incidents, some hold we have good reason 
to distinguish between two kinds of ‘privilege’. In a way, I 
think it could be said that Hohfeld himself began pointing 
towards this fact already in 1913. For as soon as identified 
the privilege of entering with the negation of a duty to stay 
off, Hohfeld quickly added the following observation, 
 
 [...] when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a 
duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor 
precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for 
 
4 I take this to be a standard definition of the hohfeldian claim. See f. ex.: “this statement we are 
not asserting that the person having the privilege has an affirmative claim against another, i. e., that 
that other is under a duty to refrain from (…)” (Cook 1919, 725); “(…) I may very well be said to 
have a right to eat my dinner, because everybody else is under a duty to refrain from interference 
with my eating my dinner (Husik 1924, 266); “One party x has a legal claim against some second 
party that y do some action A if and only ify has a legal duty to x to do A” (Wellman 1997, 76); 
“the owner of a car has a claim against others that they not drive the car and others have a duty to 
the owner not to drive the car” (Rainbolt 2006, 1); ““A has a claim that B φ [or not-φ] if and only 
if B has a duty to A to φ [or not-φ]” (Wenar 2015, 5). 
5 F. ex. ““Privilege” therefore denotes absence of duty” (Cook 1919, 725); “a privilege is the correl-
ative of a no-right and the negative of a duty” (Husik 1924, 266); “Privilege-right, therefore, is par-
aphrased by absence of duty” (Radin 1938, 1149); “a no-right and the corresponding privilege are 
converses of each other” (Fitch 1967, 269); “privilege = df. no duty-not (no prohibition)” (Mullock 
1970, 267); “X has a privilege against Y with regard to act A if and only if Y has a no-right against 
X with regard to A”; “x has a privilege against y to do p if and only if x has no duty to y not to do 
p” (Adams 1985, 85); “an individual has a privilege against a second individual with regard to a 
particular act if and only if the individual does not have a duty toward the second individual with 
regard to that act” (Saunders 1990, 468); “one party x has a legal liberty in face of some second 
party y to perform some action A if and only if x has no legal duty to y to refrain from doing A” 
(Wellman 1997, 76); “Liberties and no-claims are correlatives. X has a liberty against Y that X do A 
if and only if Y has a no-claim on X that X do A (Rainbolt 2006, 1-2); “A has a privilege to φ if and 
only if A has no duty not to φ” (Wenar 2015, 4-5).  
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some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's 
own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of 
entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent 
with this sort of duty,- for the latter is of the same content or tenor as 
the privilege;- but it still holds good that, as regards Y, X's privilege of 
entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off. Similarly, if A has 
not contracted with B to perform certain work for the latter, A's priv-
ilege of not doing so is the very negation of a duty of doing so. Here 
again the duty contrasted is of a content or tenor exactly opposite to 
that of the privilege. (Hohfeld 1913, 32-33). 
 
According to Hohfeld, then, if X has made a contracted 
with Y that stated that X had to go to Y’s land in order to fix 
Y’s roof, then we should say that X has both the privilege of 
entering Y’s land and the duty of entering Y’s land in order 
to fix Y’s roof. But what if Y just invited X to come to his 
land at any given time at his own convenience? It seems that 
in this case X would not have either the duty to enter or the 
duty not to enter Y’s land. This suggests the existence of two 
possible forms of this privilege: the privilege of going that 
comes with the duty of entering, and the privilege of going 
that comes with no such duty. The existence of this differ-
ence is of importance for our understanding of what kind of 
legal relations the concept of privilege is supposed to cover.  
As we have already noticed, Hohfeld took privilege and lib-
erty as close synonyms, and he thought that our legal liberties 
were legal privileges. Since we do not conceive of some of our 
our paradigmatic political and legal liberties, such as the lib-
erty of religion, of freedom of expression and etc., as the kind 
of liberty that Hohfeld attributes to the contractor, who must 
enter someone’s land in order to fulfill his contracted duty, 
but as a kind of liberty that comes without any legal duty to 
exercise it, it would be desirable to make room for this dif-
ference in the hohfeldian apparatus. In sections II and III, I 
consider and criticize the two attempts to do this that are 
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available to us. In section IV, I suggest a new approach. 
II. 
As far as I can tell, the most recent attempt to differentiate 
between two kinds of privilege, namely, the one that was 
made in 2005, when prof. Leif Wenar presented his ‘ex-
panded hohfeldian model’.  
According to Wenar’s expanded model, we should make 
the following distinction between privileges, 
 
A sheriff in hot pursuit of a suspect has the legal right to break down 
the door that the suspect has locked behind him. The sheriff’s having 
a legal right to break down the door implies that he has no legal duty 
not to break down the door.  [...] The sheriff’s right is a single privi-
lege. A right that is a single privilege confers an exemption from a gen-
eral duty. (Wenar 2005, 225-226). 
 
A paired privilege is composed of two privileges. The holder of a 
paired privilege has a privilege [no duty not] to phi, and also has a 
privilege [no duty not] not to phi.  [...] A person vested with a paired 
privilege is entitled to perform some action, or not to perform that 
action, as he pleases. (Wenar 2005, 226-227). 
 
Wenar’s talk of exemption is of primary importance here. 
It is evident that any rights that confer exemptions of the 
kind supposed by Wenar would be classified as privileges ac-
cording to Hohfeld, and that such rights do exist. Clear ex-
amples of rights that confer exemptions from general duties 
are certain rights conferred to people above a certain age, like 
the right not to pay for public transportation.  
Nevertheless, Wenar’s suggestion brings a considerable 
problem, namely, that it is hard to see why rights like these 
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cannot be said to be paired privileges. According to Wenar’s 
own definition, someone has a paired privilege if he has a 
privilege [no duty not] to phi, and a privilege [no duty not] 
not to phi. Why should we not say that elderly people who 
are exempt from the duty of paying for public transportation 
cannot be said to have a privilege not to pay for it and a priv-
ilege to pay for it? After all, it seems clear that in their case 
both actions become not only permitted but optional.  
Although one could hope to appeal to Wenar’s own exam-
ples for some further clarification of the difference he is pro-
posing, they turn out to be of no help at all. According to 
him, 
 
While ordinary citizens have a duty not to break down doors, police 
officers have a privilege-right [no duty not] to break down doors. 
When President Nixon asserted that he had a legal right not to turn 
over the Watergate tapes, he was asserting “executive privilege.” Ordi-
nary citizens have a legal duty to turn over evidence when subpoenaed. 
Yet Nixon alleged that because he was President he had a legal right 
[no duty not] not to turn over his evidence. James Bond’s license to 
kill is also an exemption from a general duty. Bond’s (alleged) right 
exempts him from a duty not to do what civilians emphatically have a 
duty not to do, viz., to kill. Similarly, your driver’s license gives you 
the right to drive. This right exempts you from a duty not to do what 
you would otherwise have a strong duty not to do—to operate danger-
ous machinery at high speeds. (Wenar, 2005, p. 226). 
 
As we can see, Wenar thinks we should class a police of-
ficer’s right to break down doors, Nixon’s right not to turn 
over the Watergate tapes, James Bond’s license to kill and 
our right to drive as privileges that confer exemption and, 
therefore, as single privileges. But although in these cases the 
possession of a privilege does exempt the privilege holder of 
some duty, this exemption does not imply any sort of positive 
duty to do anything. Nixon could have turned over the 
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Watergate tapes, and although I can’t claim to know how 
exactly James Bond’s license to kill works it seems clear that 
having a driver’s license does not mean one has a duty to 
drive at any point. Therefore, it seems that in at least some 
of these cases the exemption in questions makes the action 
optional, and if the action is optional it is because there is not 
duty either to do it or not to do it.  
I conclude that Wenar’s definitions are importantly 
flawed. The author introduced two concepts which were sup-
posed to divide privileges into two kinds, but they are unable 
to do so satisfactorily. 
III. 
The other attempt to make room for the difference between 
privileges in the hohfeldian apparatus was made by Moritz in 
§18 of his book titled  Über Hohfelds System der juridischen 
Grundbegriff (1960)6. Moritz’s thesis was then criticized in 
(Mullock 1970), and these criticisms were answereed in 
(Moritz 1973). In this latter article, Moritz defends his divi-
sion of the notion of privilege into two different notions, 
Priv1 and Priv2.  
According to Moritz: “Priv1(A) then means the same as 
“PA”, Priv2(A) means the same as “PA & P—A”. (Priv2A) = 
(Priv1A) & Priv1(—A)” (Moritz 1973, 428). As the author him-
self clarifies, in this definition “PA” means “not-forbidden”, 
i.e. no duty not-to, a notion that is weaker than (PA & P—A), 
i.e no duty to and no duty not-to, which the author takes to 
express ‘indifference’ in relation to an action. In this article, 
however, I prefer to use the term ‘optional’ instead of 
 
6 Although it had long been remarked that Hohfeld’s notion of privilege needed clarification – see, 
for example, (Radin 1938, 1149), it seems that it was not until Moritz’s book that interpreters con-
cerned themselves seriously with separating the two kinds of relations we are discussing here.  
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‘indifferent’ to characterize actions of the second type.  
Having said that, we can see that Moritz’s suggestion is a 
simple one: there are two types of privilege, but the second 
type is formed by the agglutination of two privileges of the 
first type. Such result could seem welcome to hohfeldian 
scholars, for it would allow us to say that Hohfeld in fact iso-
lated the basic form of the privilege, and that all other forms 
were merely derivative forms of privilege, composed by the 
agglutination of two privileges. Although this may seem to 
be an elegant and simple solution, it raises a puzzle that, as 
far as I can tell, has not yet been remarked. 
The puzzle concerns the sense in which it could be said 
that a Priv2 is the agglutination of two Priv1s of the kind pro-
posed by Moritz in his formula. According to Moritz, an in-
dividual has a Priv1 to phi if he has no duty not to phi, and 
an individual has a Priv2 to phi if he has no duty not to phi 
and no duty to phi. Now, if we ask what is status of the indi-
vidual who has a Priv1 to phi as regards his phi-ing, it seems 
we must say he has no duty not to phi and a duty to phi. For 
it is plain that one either has or does not have a duty to phi, 
and that if he does not have this duty than he has a Priv2 to 
phi, and not a Priv1. Having established that, let’s ask how 
Moritz’s suggestion would allow us to explain the formation 
of a Priv2 to phi from the agglutination of a Priv1 to phi and 
a Priv1 not to phi. 
If what is said above is correct, we should say that a Priv1 
to phi is consists (a1) no duty not to phi and (b1) a duty to 
phi, and that a Priv1 not to phi consists in (a2) no duty to phi, 
and (b2) a duty not to phi. Now, if we add this two privileges 
it seems that what we get is a privilege that is twice contradic-
tory, for it would be composed of (a1) no duty not to phi, (b2) 
a duty not to phi, (b1) a duty to phi and (a2) no duty to phi. 
How exactly are we supposed to ‘add’ all this up in order to 
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get to what a Priv2 is supposed to look like? 
As far as I can see, the most we can say is that in a Priv1 we 
find only one exemption from a duty while in a Priv2 we find 
two exemptions from two duties, that each exemption, if 
given separately, can be an operative fact that creates a Priv1, 
and that if both exemptions are granted to the same individ-
ual he will end up with a Priv2. But that is not enough for us 
to say that a Priv2 is composed of the agglutination of two 
Priv1’s. Because of this, it seems to me that the best thing to 
do is to recognize that we are in fact in front of two legal 
relations that are basic. The reason Moritz could not see this 
is because he actually gave us an incomplete definition of 
Priv1 – his definition mentioned the exemption, but failed 
to mention the duty that must come with it when the privi-
lege a Priv1 and not a Priv27. 
IV. 
To conclude, we can redefine the two forms of privilege iso-
lated by Moritz in the following manner: a Priv1 to phi is 
consists (a) no duty to phi and (b) a duty to phi, and a Priv2 
consists in (a) no duty to phi and (b) no duty not to phi. In 
the first case, phi-ing is permitted and obligatory, and in the 
second case it is permitted and optional. Besides, we can also 
say that a Priv2 to phi is not composed of the agglutination 
of a Priv1 to phi and a Priv1 not to phi and, therefore, we 
have reason to believe that a Priv2 is a second and basic form 
of privilege. Last but not least, it is worth noticing that these 
two types of privilege are importantly different.  
 
7 This is a point of Moritz’s exposition which went unnoticed and unquestioned in Mullock’s “Sav-
ing the hohfeldian privilege” (1977). Indeed, in (Mullock 1977, 256) we can see that the author 
assumes both the incomplete definition of Priv1 and the summative account of Priv2 offered by 
Mortiz, and both the definition and the account remain unchallenged in the rest of the paper. 
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Single privileges imply duties, and in non-contradictory legal 
systems a single simple privilege to phi must be attached to every 
duty to phi. Indeed, for a legal system to be non-contradictory 
one and the same individual cannot have at the same time a 
duty to phi and not to phi, i.e. be prohibited to phi and not 
to phi. Therefore, for a legal system to be non-contradictory 
it must be true that whenever one has a duty to phi one also 
has a duty not to phi and, therefore, one has a single privilege 
to phi.  Legal Single privileges confer permission to act in ac-
cordance with duties so that the imposition of these duties 
generates no contradiction inside a legal system. 
Paired privileges, on the other hand, are characterized by a 
double the absence of duty. When a legal system attributes a 
paired privilege to an individual, it is not conferring him per-
mission not to act in accordance with a given duty. It is con-
ferring permission to determine himself whether to act or 
not to act in a given way. These are the privileges which we 
associate with our dearest civil liberties. 
If what is said above is correct, this difference is indeed too 
big for any summative account to overcome.  
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